Correlation neglect, voting behaviour and information aggregation by Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny
  
Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin 
Correlation neglect, voting behaviour and 
information aggregation 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Levy, Gilat and Razin, Ronny (2015) Correlation neglect, voting behaviour and information 
aggregation. American Economic Review. pp. 1-14. ISSN 0002-8282 (In Press) 
 
© 2014 AEA 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60517/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: December 2014 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
Correlation Neglect, Voting Behaviour and
Information Aggregation
Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin, LSE1
Abstract: In this paper we analyse elections when voters underestimate the correlation
between their information sources (correlation neglect). We nd that this cognitive
bias can improve political outcomes. We show that the extreme beliefs which result from
correlation neglect induce some voters to base their vote on information rather than on
political preferences. We characterise conditions on the distribution of preferences under
which this induces higher vote shares for the optimal policies and better information
aggregation.
1 Introduction
A large literature in Political Science has documented the incompetency of voters in
collecting and processing information. Voters have been shown to be poorly informed
about what they vote on (Campbell et al 1960, Kinder and Sears 1985, Bartels 1996
and Delli, Carpini and Keeter 1996) and to use the information they do have incorrectly
(Achen and Bartels 2004, Wolfers 2009, Leigh 2009, Healy, Malhotra and Mo 2010, Huber,
Hill and Lenz 2012, and Lau and Redlawsk 2001). As Bartels (1996) writes:
One of the most striking contributions to the political science of half a
century of survey research has been to document how poorly ordinary citizens
approximate a classical ideal of informed democratic citizenship.
While there is a consensus about voters being misinformed, the implication of this for
political outcomes is not obvious. Some have suggested that voters compensate for this
by using cues and information short-cuts to arrive at informed voting decisions (Lupia
1994, Popkin 1991).2 Others, on the other hand, show how large electorates take decisions
that are far from an informed ideal.3 Caplan (2007) claims that voters make systematic
errors, arising from incorrect beliefs, and thus elections fail to aggregate information.4
1We thank the editor and three anonymous referees. We also thank seminar participants, and confer-
ence participants in the Queen Mary Theory workshop 2013, the LSE Political Economy workshop 2013,
and the Princeton/Warwick Political Economy workshop 2014.
2Popkin (1991) has coined the term low-information signalling to describe how voters are able to
make rational choices between candidates by using information short-cuts.
3See Bartels (1996), Druckman (2012) and Taber et al (2006).
4For a recent and thorough survey of this literature see Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (forthcom-
ing).
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In this paper we argue that voters incorrect beliefs might actually improve voting
outcomes. To do so, we focus on incorrect beliefs which arise due to the cognitive bias
of correlation neglect (De Marzo et al 2003, Ortoleva and Snowberg, forthcoming, and
Glaeser and Sunstein 2009). This cognitive bias implies that individuals neglect the level
of correlation between the di¤erent sources of information they are exposed to.5 We
characterise how incorrect beliefs due to correlation neglect a¤ect voting behaviour. We
then compare the information aggregation properties of elections in electorates with such
voters to electorates with rational voters (who are aware of the correlation of their sources
of information).
Specically, we analyse a voting model with heterogeneous voters who have to choose
between two policies, one on the right and one on the left, using majority rule. Voters
ideal policies depend on their preference parameters, and an unknown state, which is the
same for all voters. All voters prefer the policy on the right in a right-wing state of the
world, and the policy on the left in a left-wing state of the world, albeit with di¤erent
intensities. Each voter receives signals about the state of the world and makes voting
decisions given this information and her preferences. We assume that signals might be
correlated but that behavioural voters neglect the correlation in these sources, while
rational voters do not.
Our result is that correlation neglect can be and is, in many standard environments
benecial for information aggregation: Even if each behavioural voter does not vote op-
timally from her own point of view (compared to a rational voter), the whole electorate
may reach better, more informed, outcomes (compared to a rational electorate).
Intuitively, correlation neglect magnies the e¤ect of information on individualsbe-
haviour. Individuals who might otherwise stick with the policy that accords with the
direction of their political preferences may be swayed to change their vote if they believe
that their information is su¢ ciently strong in the opposite direction. This implies that
individuals base their vote more on their information rather than on their preferences.
For relatively symmetric distributions of preferences, more informative voting implies
that the vote share for the optimal policy is higher in the behavioural electorate in both
states of the world. More generally, whether the vote share for the optimal policy is higher
in a behavioural electorate, and in which state, depends on the distribution of preferences.
We nd that when the distribution of preferences is skewed, correlation neglect tends to
work against that. For example, if the electorate is somewhat leaning to the right, the
vote share for the optimal policy in the left state of the world is higher in a behavioural
5In the context of nancial markets, Eyster and Weizsacker (2012) conduct an experiment to show
that individuals neglect correlation when choosing a portfolio. See also Kallir and Sonsino (2009) and
Enke and Zimmermann (2013).
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electorate compared to a rational one. This implies that the potential advantage of the
behavioural electorate can be maintained with non-symmetric distributions of preferences.
If the electorate leans to the right, then when the optimal policy is to the right, it will be
chosen whether voters neglect correlation or not. However, when the optimal policy is to
the left, it may be chosen by a behavioural electorate when it would not be chosen by a
rational one.
To illustrate the implication of the above, we consider an environment with aggregate
shocks to voterspreferences. Specically, voterspreferences might shift to the right or
to the left (in a monotone likelihood ratio sense). We show that for each such distribu-
tion a behavioural electorate aggregates either the same or more information compared
with a rational electorate. Thus, ex ante, in such environments, a behavioural electorate
aggregates strictly more information than a rational one.
This paper is related to a recent literature on correlation neglect. In Ortoleva and
Snowberg (forthcoming) individuals receive a stream of signals, some correlated. Their
model implies that the higher is the level of correlation neglect of an individual, the more
extreme his beliefs will be. De Marzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) analyse a model of
multiple rounds of communication (in a network) when players neglect correlation. They
show that this implies that views will become concentrated on a one-dimensional con-
ict. While both these papers focus on individual beliefs, we instead focus on embedding
correlation neglect in a voting model and thus consider collective decisions.
Glaeser and Sunstein (2009) model a similar behaviour in a group setup, where agents
ignore the correlation between theirsand othersinformation. They show that a group
may perform worse than an individual decision maker.6 Our results are complementary
to theirs. In our model, information is aggregated through voting. Individuals with
correlation neglect overweigh their information and therefore vote more informatively.
Such voting decisions are wrong for the individual but in the aggregate, produce more
informative outcomes. In Glaeser and Sunstein (2009) on the other hand, information is
shared among the members of the group prior to the decision being taken. This implies
that the whole group acts as an individual who neglects the correlation across the signals
and therefore makes the wrong decision.
Our analysis also contributes to the literature on group decision making with Bayesian
failures or cognitive biases. For example, Benabou (2013) and Bolton, Brunermeir and
Veldkamp (2013) show the benets of overcondence, while Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita (forthcoming) provide examples under which behavioural biases might be ben-
ecial for voters when one takes into account the strategic behaviour of politicians.
6For some experimental studies see Brown (1986) and Schkade, Sunstein and Kahneman (2000).
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2 The Model
An electorate composed of a continuum of voters needs to choose between two policies r
and l where r 2 [0; 1] and l =  r. Each voter i has a preference parameter vi distributed
according to some full support F (vi) with density f(vi) on [ 1; 1]. The utility of the
voters, specied below, will also depend on the chosen policy as well as on the realisation
of a state of the world, ! 2 f 1; 1g: The common prior is that each state occurs with
equal probability.7
The information structure: We analyse the simplest environment that allows us
to consider correlation neglect. Assume that each voter i receives two private signals
s1i ; s
2
i 2 f 1; 1g: A signal sji ; j 2 f1; 2g; has accuracy q  12 ; that is, Pr(sji = !j!) = q.
With probability ; the signals s1i ; s
2
i are fully correlated, and with probability 1  ; they
are (conditionally) independent.8
In what follows we compare behaviouralvoters to rational voters. We assume that a
behavioural voter does not understand that the signals might be correlated. Such a voter
always believes that the signals are conditionally independent. A rational voter on the
other hand, is aware of the information structure, and specically also fully recognizes
when the signals are fully correlated and when they are independent.9
Note that compared with a rational voter, the beliefs of a behavioural voter would be
wrong in the sense that they would be too extreme; when the signals are correlated, the
voter would believe he has two signals pointing in one direction, where in truth there is
only one such signal.10
Below we will compare two types of electorates. A rational electorate consists of rational
voters and a behavioural electorate consists of behavioural voters.11
The political environment and utilities: Upon the realization of the signals s1i and
s2i ; and given their posterior beliefs, voters vote either for platform r or for l. Let V
J
y (!)
denote the vote share for policy y 2 fr; lg in state ! for an electorate J 2 fR;Bg; that is,
when the electorate has rational and behavioural voters respectively. We assume a simple
7Given that we consider general distributions of preferences, the symmetry of the policies and of the
prior is a normalization.
8Our analysis can be extended to the introduction of many signals and states of the world, to a more
complicated correlation structure and to di¤erent degrees of accuracies or correlation levels of the signals.
9The assumption that a rational voter fully recognizes when the signals are fully correlated is made
for simplicity; we can assume instead that he takes the probability  into consideration in his Bayesian
updating.
10See also Ortoleva and Snowberg (forthcoming) and Glaeser and Sustein (2009).
11It will be clear from the analysis that it is su¢ cient to focus on the two extreme cases and results for
mixed electorates can be easily derived.
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majority rule so that policy y wins under electorate J in state ! if V Jy (!) >
1
2
and with
some probability if V Jy (!) =
1
2
:
Denote by y the policy that is chosen in the election. As is standard, we assume that
a voter with a preference parameter vi derives a higher utility from the political outcome
being closer to her ideal policy ! + vi: Specically, a voters expected utility is given by
E!( (! + vi   y)2):
Note that we assume that vi 2 [ 1; 1]; hence for all voters, policy l is optimal in state
! =  1 and policy r is optimal in state ! = 1. Thus the optimal policy matchesthe
state of the world and all voters agree on the optimal policy conditional on the state.
Voting strategies: Note that as we have a continuum of voters, each voter is pivotal
with probability zero. We assume that voters vote sincerely, so that voter vi votes for r
i¤ E![ (! + vi   r)2]  E![ (! + vi   l)2]. An alternative assumption could have been
to model a nite population and analyse strategic voting. Such a model can be shown to
yield similar results.12 However, as the focus of this paper is on voters who are unable
to process information correctly, strategic voting -which involves sophisticated cognitive
capabilities- might not be the most appropriate modelling assumption.
Information Aggregation: Let pJ(!) be the probability that the optimal policy in
state ! is chosen when the electorate is of type J 2 fR;Bg. We say that an electorate
of type J aggregates more information than an electorate of type J 0 if pJ(!)  pJ 0(!) for
! 2 f 1; 1g; with one of these inequalities strict. When pJ(!) = pJ 0(!) for ! 2 f 1; 1g;
we will say that the electorates of type J and J 0 aggregate the same level of information.
While information aggregation is interesting in its own right, it also has strong norma-
tive implications in our model. As all voters are in [ 1; 1], better information aggregation
implies a Pareto improvement. For other environments (where for example for some voters
the right policy is always optimal), our positive results hold and information aggregation
can be normatively motivated by an equivalence to a model in which the whole electorate
knows the aggregated information. See Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) for a similar
notion of full information equivalence. Moreover, in some more general environments,
such as relatively symmetric ones, better information aggregation will still imply higher
average welfare.
12We show this in an online appendix. For a model with nite population and strategic voters (who learn
from being pivotal), we show that when the distribution of preferences is symmetric then a behavioural
electorate induces more information aggregation than a rational one, that this is robust to asymmetric
perturbations, and, using an example, that this holds for large asymmetries as well.
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3 Voting behaviour and vote shares
We now characterize the voting behaviour of rational and behavioural voters. To this
end, it will be enough to look at the cases in which voters have one signal, or believe that
they have two conditionally independent signals. Let
v0  2q   1 < v00  2q   1
q2 + (1  q)2 :
The results below pertain to voters in [0; 1]; where the results for voters with vi 2 [ 1; 0]
are derived in a similar fashion.13
Lemma 1: Consider all voters with v 2 [0; 1]. (i) One signal: A voter with v < v0
who observes only one signal votes r (l) if the signal is 1 ( 1): A voter with v > v0 who
observes only one signal votes for r. (ii) Two signals: A voter with v < v00 who believes
he has two independent signals votes for r unless the two signals are  1. A voter with
v > v00 always votes for r:
Note that whether a voter is rational or behavioural will matter only when the signals
are correlated, that is, with probability . Suppose that the state is ! = 1: The gure
below shows the probability that di¤erent voters cast the vote for the optimal policy r,
as derived from Lemma 1, when the signals are correlated:
0 v’-v’ v’’-v’’
Rational
Behavioural
1qq00 1
0 q qq q 1
Figure 1: The probability that each voter votes for r in state ! = 1 in the event that the
signals are correlated.
As can be seen in the gure, a voter with v > v00 will vote for r no matter how she
processes information. This occurs as her strong preference parameter overwhelms even
two  1 signals (analogously, a voter with v <  v00 will always vote l). Consider now a
moderate voter in [0; v0]: Again, such a voter would behave in the same way disregarding
how she processes information. To see this, note that when the signals are fully correlated,
and she is rational, she follows her (one) signal and thus votes for r if her signal is 1 (which
arises with probability q when the state is ! = 1). If she is behavioural, she mistakenly
believes that she has two independent signals. As the signals are correlated, she either
observes ( 1; 1) or (1; 1). She therefore also votes for r if her signal is 1 and for l
13The proof is straightforward.
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otherwise and thus also follows her signal. Analogously, moderate left-wing voters would
follow their signal in either case.
Consider now the more interesting case of intermediate right-wing voters in [v0; v00]. A
rational voter in this interval who realizes that she only has one signal, votes for r for sure
as her signal is not su¢ cient to outweigh her political preferences. On the other hand, if
she is behavioural, she votes for r with a lower probability; if her signal is  1; she believes
she has received ( 1; 1); and is convinced to vote for l. She therefore votes for r only if
her signal is 1 (which arises with probability q in state ! = 1). Thus, a behavioural voter
in this interval votes less often for r compared with a rational voter. Finally, consider an
intermediate left-wing voter with v 2 [ v00; v0]: When the signals are correlated, such
voter never votes for r when she is rational, but when behavioural, she votes for r with
probability q (again, the probability that her signal is 1). Thus a behavioural intermediate
left-wing voter votes more often for r compared with a rational voter.
More generally, when behavioural, each intermediate voter votes on average more in
line with the state of the world rather than with the direction of her political preferences.
Therefore, in terms of vote shares for the optimal policies we should look at the relative
measures of the sets of intermediate voters as well as at the accuracy of the signal, q. In
what follows, let  denote the relative share of the left-wing intermediate voters among
all intermediate voters:
  F ( v
0)  F ( v00)
F ( v0)  F ( v00) + F (v00)  F (v0) :
Our next result characterizes conditions on  2 (0; 1) and q 2 (0:5; 1) under which a
behavioural electorate induces higher vote shares for the optimal policy.
Lemma 2: (i) The vote share for the optimal policy in the left state (! =  1) is higher
in an electorate of behavioural voters (V Bl ( 1) > V Rl ( 1)) i¤  < q. (ii) The vote share
for the optimal policy in the right state (! = 1) is higher in an electorate of behavioural
voters (V Br (1) > V
R
r (1)), i¤  > 1  q:
Proof: By Lemma 1 we have that V Br (1)   V Rr (1) = [q(F ( v0)   F ( v00))   (1  
q)(F (v00) F (v0))] and V Bl ( 1) V Rl ( 1) = [q(F (v00) F (v0)) (1 q)(F ( v0) F ( v00))]:
This gives (i) and (ii).
Note that Lemma 2 implies that if 1  q <  < q; the vote share for the optimal policy
is higher in a behavioural electorate in both states of the world. More generally, Lemma
2 implies that the voting behaviour of behavioural voters tends to correctfor biases in
the distribution of preferences. For example, when intermediate voters are not too left-
leaning and possibly right-leaning ( < q), a behavioural electorate will induce a higher
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vote share for the optimal policy in the left state (compared to a rational one). Below we
illustrate how this can be translated into better information aggregation.
4 Information aggregation
We now esh out the implications of Lemma 2 by focusing on information aggregation. We
consider a general family of distributions of political preferences, including distributions
which can be skewed to the left or to the right. We analyse information aggregation for
these distributions and when there is uncertainty over which of them determines voters
preferences on election day.
For relatively symmetric distributions (that satisfy 1 q <  < q); we know that the vote
shares for the optimal policies are higher in both states of the world when the electorate is
behavioural. For such distributions, a behavioural electorate would aggregate at least the
same information as a rational electorate, and in fact, it is easy to nd such distributions
for which a behavioural electorate would aggregate more information than a rational
electorate (that is, when for example V Br (1) > V
R
r (1) >
1
2
and V Bl ( 1) > 12 > V Rl ( 1)):
What happens though when the distribution is not su¢ ciently symmetric? Suppose that
 < 1   q so that the intermediate voters are right-leaning. In this case the behavioural
electorate will lead to a higher vote share only in the state that goes against the bias of
the electorate. That is, in ! =  1 we have that V Bl ( 1) > V Rl ( 1), while in ! = 1;
V Rr (1) > V
B
r (1). A trade-o¤ may arise therefore between the two electorates as each
yields a higher vote share for the optimal policy in a di¤erent state.
Intuition suggests though that the potential advantage of the behavioural electorate
over the rational one would still be maintained even if political preferences of the whole
population are biased in one direction. If the whole population is biased for example to
the right, voting in the right state (! = 1) should be less of an issue, as the optimal policy
will be chosen at that state anyway. On the other hand, it is the left state (! =  1) that
becomes more problematic for information aggregation. But, in a right-leaning society,
this is exactly the state in which the behavioural electorate has a comparative advantage
in facilitating voting for the optimal policy.
We now formalize this intuition. We model shocks to the utility of voters as monotone
likelihood ratio (MLR) shifts of the distribution of preference parameters. For distribu-
tions F and F 0 with densities f and f 0 we say that F 0 MLR F i¤f 0(v0)=f 0(v)  f(v0)=f(v)
for all v0 > v. Intuitively, F 0 MLR F implies that the distribution F 0 puts relatively more
weight on higher values, implying for example a rst order stochastic shift of the distrib-
ution of preference parameters to the right.
Let the set F consists of at least one symmetric distribution F S and all the distributions
F such that (i) F MLR F S for some F S 2 F , or (ii) there is some F S 2 F such that
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F S MLR F . Finally let G 2 (F) denote a full support probability distribution over
the set F :
In what follows we assume that the distribution of preferences on the day of the election
is itself distributed according to G. We evaluate information aggregation ex post as well
as ex-ante, before the resolution of the draw from G. We then have:
Proposition 1: (i) For any F 2 F ; a behavioural electorate aggregates the same or
more information than a rational electorate and for some F 2 F ; it aggregates more
information. (ii) If F is drawn according to G, then ex-ante, a behavioural electorate
aggregates more information than a rational electorate.
Proof: We will rst show (i), that is, that for any F 2 F a behavioural electorate
aggregates the same or more information than a rational electorate and that for some
F 2 F it aggregates more information. As G is full support this will su¢ ce to prove (ii).
Let F S 2 F be a symmetric distribution. By symmetry and full support, we have
that V Rr (1) >
1
2
and V Rl ( 1) > 12 (as some voters vote informatively and those who do
not, cancel each other). By Lemma 2, we then have that V Br (1) > V
R
r (1) >
1
2
and
V Bl ( 1) > V Rl ( 1) > 12 . Therefore, under F S, a behavioural electorate aggregates the
same information as a rational electorate does.
We now show that for any F 0 MLR F S, under F 0, a behavioural electorate aggregates
at least the same (and sometimes more) information than a rational electorate. The same
arguments can be used to prove the same claim for F 0 such that F S MLR F 0.
So assume that F 0 MLR F S. Note that F 0 MLR F S implies that F 0 rst order
stochastically dominates F S. As under F S we have that V Jr (1) >
1
2
for J = B;R; by rst
order stochastic dominance, a shift to F 0 will imply that vote shares for r only increase.
Therefore, both electorates achieve the optimal outcome in ! = 1.
Note that under F S;  = 1
2
< q. We now show that if F 0 MLR F S then for F 0;  < q.
Note that F 0 MLR F S implies,
f 0(v) f
0(0)
fS(0)
fS(v) for all v 2 [v0; v00]
f 0(v) f
0(0)
fS(0)
fS(v) for all v 2 [ v00; v0]
and hence as we shift from F S to F 0;  (weakly) decreases from a half because, given the
symmetry of fS; we have that:Z
v2[v0;v00]
f 0(v)dv f
0(0)
fS(0)
Z
v2[v0;v00]
fS(v)dv =
f 0(0)
fS(0)
Z
v2[ v00; v0]
fS(v)dv
Z
v2[ v00; v0]
f
0
(v)dv;
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and hence   1
2
< q for F 0:
By Lemma 2, since  < q, we have that, under F 0, V Bl ( 1) > V Rl ( 1). This implies
that a behavioural electorate aggregates at least the same and possibly more information
than a rational electorate.
We now complete the proof by showing that there exists such F 0 2 F under which a
behavioural electorate aggregates more information than a rational electorate. We do this
by nding an F 0 such that F 0 MLR F S and V Bl ( 1) > 12 > V Rl ( 1): Note that under
F S, V Bl ( 1) > V Rl ( 1) > 12 . Also note that F contains all F such that F MLR F S and
given Lemma 2 and the above, for all such F; V Bl ( 1) > V Rl ( 1). Obviously there exists
F 00 2 F such that F 00 MLR F S and 12 > V Bl ( 1) > V Rl ( 1). By continuity one can nd
F 0 2 F such that F 0 MLR F S and V Bl ( 1) > 12 > V Rl ( 1).
The proof follows the intuition provided above. A shift of society to the right (to a dis-
tribution function which dominates in the MLR sense) guarantees that the optimal policy
is chosen in the right-wing state under both electorates, while a behavioural electorate will
outperform a rational one in the left-wing state. Continuity and full support guarantee
that we can nd such shifts for which a behavioural electorate will strictly outperform a
rational one. Analogously, this would also be the case for a shift of society to the left (to
a distribution function which is dominated in the MLR sense).
5 Discussion: overcondence and conrmation bias
Correlation neglect, as noted by others (see Ortoleva and Snowberg, forthcoming, or
Glaeser and Sunstein 2009), leads to overcondence as agents become more convinced of
their beliefs when they underestimate the level of the correlation of their information.
Another potential source of overcondence is conrmation bias. Rabin and Schrag (1999)
advocate a view of conrmation bias according to which agents interpret information
which is contrary to their initial beliefs, in line with these beliefs.
Here we provide a version of our model with conrmation bias and show that an elec-
torate of voters with such a bias will behave on the aggregate as a rational electorate
does. Therefore, our results depend on the particular behavioural bias assumed.
We maintain the same environment as in the main model. To illustrate our point in
the simplest way assume that f(v) is symmetric around 0 so that f(vi) = f( vi). To
model conrmation bias, we assume that the two signals a voter receives, s1i and s
2
i , are
independent, conditional on the state. We say that an individual has conrmation bias
(a-la Rabin and Schrag 1999), if whenever there is a conict between the realisations of s1i
and s2i , then with probability  the individual believes that the realisation of s
2 is actually
the same as s1i . However, when a voter is rational, he correctly recognizes the realisation
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of the signal.14
Note that voters with conrmation bias will always believe that they have two indepen-
dent signals. Therefore, voting behaviour is still given by Lemma 1. In particular, when
they observe two signals, all individuals with vi  v00 vote for r unless s1i = s2i =  1, and
all individuals in [v00; 1] always vote for r: Still, when compared to rational voters, there
will be no change in the vote share for the correct outcome:
Lemma 3 The vote shares in the model of conrmation bias are the same for both
electorates, rational and behavioural.
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose without loss of generality that ! = 1: Voters in [0; v00] will
vote for r unless they observe two -1 signals, which happens with probability (1   q)2
for rationals but with probability (1   q)(1   q + q) > (1   q)2 for behavioural. The
di¤erence is then q(1  q): But note that voters in [ v00; 0] will vote for r only if they see
two 1 signals, which happens with probability q2 for rationals and q(q + (1   q)) > q2
for behaviourals. The di¤erence in these probabilities is again q(1  q): Therefore, if the
distribution of voters is symmetric we will have the same vote shares for rational voters
and for those with conrmation bias.
Thus, while both correlation neglect and conrmation bias induce overcondence, mod-
elling them explicitly -and in particular modelling the relevant information structure that
allows them to arise- allows us to arrive at a di¤erent conclusion (compared with Lemma
2). This occurs because conrmation bias leads to di¤erences in voting behaviour only
when there is a mismatch between the two independent signals. As the two signals are
ex ante symmetric, right-wing and left-wing voters cancel out the di¤erences with a
rational electorate. On the other hand, with correlation neglect, the di¤erence between
behavioural and rational voters arises when the signals are correlated. In this case left-
wing and right-wing behavioural voters do not cancel each other but reinforce one
another as both vote informatively based on their -single- signal. The vote shares in a
symmetric electorate would then be strictly higher for the optimal policy compared with
a rational electorate.
6 Conclusion
The fact that voters are often misinformed is well established in the Political Science
literature. This has been interpreted as a source of concern for the performances of
14Note that an alternative way to anchor the conrmation bias would be to let voters receive (or
interpret) information in line with their initial ideology. However if the anchor for conrmation bias is
not based on any informative content, voters will vote less informatively than rational voters. In contrast,
correlation neglect, by denition, has an informative anchor. For a better comparison with our model of
correlation neglect we therefore assume that the anchor is informative.
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democracies. Our paper provides a critique of this literature by pointing out that voters
misinformed and biased voting behaviour could help alleviate inherent externalities that
are present in voting. In particular, the role of elections as information aggregation mech-
anisms is hampered by voterstendency to vote too much according to their ideological
preferences than is socially e¢ cient. What we show is that a prevalent bias in processing
information, correlation neglect, magnies the response of voters to their own information
and so, in the aggregate, can alleviate these externalities.
The paper provides several insights about the role of elections as aggregating informa-
tion when voters are misinformed. First, to understand the e¤ects of voter incompetence
or misinformation on the performance of the political system, one needs to fully con-
sider all of the externalities that are inherent in the political process when voters are
competent. In this sense our critique complements the work of Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita (forthcoming) who focus on another externality, namely the response of strate-
gic politicians to the level of information held by the voters. Second, the particular way
in which voters misuse their information is important. As we show, when voters exhibit
conrmation bias rather than correlation neglect, the externalities present in voting are
maintained. Therefore, it is paramount that we have a better idea of the main biases and
deviations from rationality that a¤ect voting behaviour.
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